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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SECURITY TITLE COMPANY,
a corporation.
Plaintiff,
-vs.-

EUGENIA R. HUNT, FRED T.
AOKI, and KYIOKO AOKI, his
wife; NOBURO AOKI and EVA
T. AOKI, his wife, and the ALTA
REALTY AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.
Defendants.

Case
No. 8953

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Statement of Case
Appellant is appealling from an Interpleader Action,
Wherein a judgment was entered by the trail court, in
favor of all defendants other than defendant, Eugenia
R. Hunt, granting specific performance of a Uniform
Real Estate contract, and the execution of an escrow in
connection therewith.
1
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Appellant was the owner of a fourplex located at
453 East 8th South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and on the
1st day of June, 1957, listed said property for sale with
Alta Realty and Construction Co., through one of their
agents, Florence 0. Young, a licensed real estate saleslady. The listing was made on a sales agency contract for
apartment listings (Exhibit 13 "D") a forn1 approved
hy the Utah State Securities Commission for use by the
Salt Lake Real Estate Board and Multiple Listing Bureau, of which Alta Realty and Construction Company
is a n1ember. Said listing offered said property for sale at
a purchase price of $38,000.00, and also provided that
appellant would consider as downpayment a small home
with an apartment or a small duplex.
Alta Realty and Construction Company found a
buyer ready, willing and able to pay the purchase price,
provided the appellant would take as a down payment a
converted duplex located at 1027 East 2nd South Street
in Salt Lake City, Utah, as per the listing agreement,
tlw same being owned by Fred T. Aoki and Kiyoko
.June Aoki, his wife, respondents herein. Said property
was burdened hy a mortgage of $2,000.00 at that time.
Appellant objected to the property having a mortgage on
it, so respondents paid it off. See the uncontroverted
testi1nony of Florence 0. Young, Agent of Alta Realty,
(TR 7fi) while being cross exa1nined as a hostile w-itness.
A.

"1\lr~. Hunt would not take the deal unless
that property was c.Ieared. It had a $2,000.00
mortgage on it and the Aoki's rleared that
off.''

And again ( TR 84).
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q.

'"l\Irs. Young, you stated under questioning
that Mrs. I-Iunt would not accept the property
because it wasn't clear."

A.

"That is right."

Q.

"And in order to make it clear you stated the
Aoki's went down and paid it off."

A.

"Uh, huh, it was a $2,000.00 mortgage."

Appellant had also objected to the property being
vacant and didn't want to be bothered trying to keep it
rented. It had been suggested to appellant that the property be sold on contract and appellant hold the contract,
or resell it for cash. Appellant was agreeable to the
suggestion, and required that the property be sold ~and
she to be furnished the contract. See the uncontroverted
testimony of Florence 0. Young, agent of Alta Realty,
relating to the duplex being sold an contract, while being
cross-examined as a hostile witness (TR 85).

Q. "It was sold on contract 1"
A.

"Yes."

Q. "At whose request was it
A.

sold~"

"Mrs. Hunts."

Q. "Now, would you state why :Mrs. Hunt wanted
that sold."
A.

"Because she wanted the property cleared.''

Q.

"Would you state again why Mrs. Hunt
wanted you to have the property sold hefore
it would be acceptable to her as a trade."

A.

"She would accept a real estate contract, but
not the property."
3
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Said duplex property was sold for $10,500.00 with
$1,000.00 down, to a Wanda Nelson, on a Uniform Real
Estate Contract (Exhibt 4).
Now that the mortgage of $2,000.00 had been paid
and the property sold on contract, the requirements of
appellant had been met, and an Exchange Agreement
(Exhibit 1 P) was prepared. An Exchange Agreement
is also a fonn approved by the rtah State Securities
Cmn1nission for use of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board,
and l\lultiple Listings Bureau, and is a preliminary
contract to the final contract of sale where exchanges
of property are Inade, just the same as an Earnest ~loney
Agree1~1ent is a preliminary contract to the final contract
of sale when any home is bought or sold. Knowing that
should appellant wish to convert her contract on the
Second South property to cash, it would be necessary
that it be discounted, and to give added protection to
appellant, Alta Realty required the Aokis' to purchase
appellant's property for $39,500.00. This ''Tould allow
appellant to sell the $10,500.00 contract, (having an un- ·
paid balance of $9,500 .00) for $8,000.00 cash, and still not
realize less than $38,000.00, the sun1 for which said property was listed. The exchange agreement was executed
h~· the appellants and respondents~ and under the authority therein, Alta Realty delivered srune to the Security
Title Cmnpan~·. together with the abstracts on both
properties, with a request that the abstracts be brought
to date and the final papers prepared and the transaction
be closed. See thP testiinony of Iferbert H. Halliday,
Attorney at Law and manager of the Security Title Company, Sugarhouse Branch (TR 4 & 5).
4
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Q.

''Would vou state to the Court when you first
became ~cquainted with the parties respecting
this transaction."

A.

"Well, it was during the month of August.
Alta Realty Cmnpany brought me in an Exchange Agreement and an Earnest Money
Agreement and requested that we continue
the abstracts on both pieces of property concerned and prepare the closing papers."

See the further testimony of Herbert H. Halliday
(TR 6).
"Well, upon receipt of these, of the Exchange
Agreement and the Earnest Money Agreement, we obtained abstracts on both pieces
of property and they were continued to date.
Then contracts were prepared .and individual
buyers and sellers escrow statements were
prepared based upon the facts contained in
the Exchange Agreement and the Earnest
1
Money
in preparation for closing the transacVv( ({{tf
tions between the parties.''
A.

After the necessary documents were prepared and
abstracting completed, a closing date was set for on or ,-./fkL'i /,._.
·-) appo-intmef!t;and 88tigltt emJPSsl ieftt.same say 7 ~
//:,
appointment, and sough counsel that same day, and employed one, Dean Sheffield, Attorney at Law, as counsel.
The respondents herein then sought and employed present
respondent counsel.
Appellant counsel, Dean Sheffield and present respondent counsel met to discuss and clarify any problems
connected with this transaction. Mr. Sheffield raised
three objections.
5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. He had not had time to check the credit of Wanda
Nelson, Contract buyer of the duplex.

2. He had not met or been able to talk to Wanda
Nelson.
3. The exchange agreement was signed by Fred
Aoki and his wife, and the Real Estate contract was running to Nobuo Aoki and his wife.

To satisfy objection 1\ o. 1, it was agreed that Ray
Hem1ningway, President and O\vner of Alta Realty and
Construction Company would guarantee payment on said
contract, and his signature appears as an obligor thereon
in evidence of same.
To satisfy objection No. 2, respondent counsel furnished Mr. Sheffield the telephone number of said Wanda
Nelson. and ~I r. Sheffield called and talked to her. Se~
the testilnony of Appellant concerning these objections
(TR 118).

Q.

"Well, did your counsel tell you that I gave
him the telephone number of Wanda Nelson
in Arizona?"

A. "No."
Q. "And that he called personally and talked to
her,··
A.

''He said he had talked to her, yes.··

'To satisfy objection No. 3, Fred Aoki, N obuo Aoki
and their wives all signed the contract, obligating them
all to pay according to the tern1s therein. See the testiInony of appe1lant (TR 120).
6
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Q.

''Well, did your counsel Dean Sheffield tell
you that I had assured him that all names of
the four Aokis' would appear on the contract
if it was of concern to you rather than just
two~"

A.

"I think he told me that on the phone."

Security Title was notified of the arrangements made
by counsel of appellant and respondent counsel, and a
date was set for closing the transaction on or about the 1st
day of October, 1957.
On said day set for closing the transaction, appellant
appeared with counsel at the office of the Security Title
Company, Sugarhouse Branch, and examined the documents. Said papers were not signed at that time inasmuch
as the original date for closing was September 1st, 1957,
and all pro-rata figures were adjusted to that date. A
request was made to change the pro-rata date to N ovember 1st, inasmuch as it was already October. This request
was made to respondent's counsel and was accepted and
agreed. See the testimony of Herbert H. H·alliday, Attorney at Law and :Manager of Security Title Company,
Sugarhouse Branch (TR 8).

Q. "Now, you stated that Mrs. Hunt came to
your office. Did you have any discussions with
her respecting the buyers or sellers statement?''
A.

"Yes we did."

Q. "Would you state what the nature of that
discussion was and when it took place."
A.

"To the best of my knowledge she came to
my office with her attorney, Dean Sheffield
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It was either the last part of September or
the very first part of October, 1957. All of the
papers which I had prepared were discussed
and explained to her by her ·attorney, .Jlr.
Sheffield. There was, as I recall, one
main objection for her not signing the papers
at that time and that was because my papers
were - my statements were pro-rated on the
basis of the exchange agreement on September 1st and, of course, it was now about the
1st of October, and therefore they felt that
the pro-ration should be changed to the 1st
of November.''

Q. "Was any change made in the pro-ration on
the statements as a result of that confliction?"
A. "I did not make any change. I made notations
of their request that it be changed and infanned them that I would discuss the matter
with the buyers, and if it was satisfactory
with the buyers, the changes would be made."
Q. "Did you so discuss it with the buyers?'~
A. "I personally did not discuss it with the buyers. This happened just a day or two before
I was scheduled to go on a vacation, and because of that situation, the file was turned
over to l\fr. Henegar. who "-P..:-: Escrow Officer
at our Ina in offiee downtown, and he was requested to redraft and redraw the papers to
show this ne"- pro-ration date. I discussed it
with the buyers, .Jr r. Quigley. their attorney.
and he stated X ovetnber 1st pro-ration date
would he satisfHc.tory. This infor1nation I
pasRed on to ~rr. Henegar.'"

'rhe new date for closing the transaction was set
for October 10, 1957. at the main office of Security Title
Contpany, and the closing to be handled under the supervision of H. D. Henegar, their Escrow Officer.
8
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On the lOth day of October, 1957, appellant, with
her counsel, appeared at the office of Security Title
Company, at the appointed time, for the purpose of
closing the transaction. All papers and documents were
again examined by appellant and her attorney and signed.
Appellant also, at that tin1e, paid in certain monies required by the closing papers, which were also examined
by appellant and counsel and signed. See the cross examination of H. D. Henegar, Escrow Officer of Security
Title Company (TR 30).

Q. "Mr. Henegar, you have just testified that
Mrs. Hunt, accompanied by her attorney,
came to your office at the appointed time,
October lOth to close the transaction 1"
A.

"That is correct."

Q. "At that time, did Mr. Sheffield again go
over with Mrs. Hunt all of the papers and
explain them to her~''
A.

"He did."

Q.

"And she signed the papers after the explanation to her by her counsel?"

A.

"She did.''

And further ( TR 31).

Q.

"Now did Mrs. Hunt at the time she was in
your office with Mr. Sheffield, after he had
explained all documents to her, and after she
had placed her signature upon the docurnents,
did she voluntarily pay in the money and the
necessary - if there would be anything else
necessary to close the transaction f'

A.

"She did."
9
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Q.

"Was there anything left for Mrs. Hunt to
do or counsel for Mrs. Hunt other than ex~amine the abstract of the property they were
turning in on the exchange agreement?"

A.

"Nothing".

The escrow was complete and ready for execution
as soon as the abstract on the duplex was examined by
Mr. Sheffield. Mr. Sheffield was given the abstract on
October 10, and late in the afternoon of October 16, Mr.
Henegar called 1\Ir. Sheffield and was promised he would
have it ready the following morning, October 17. The
morning of the 17th, :Mrs. Hunt appeared at the office
of the Security Title Company with new counsel, and
threatened suit if the escrow be distributed. Subsequently,
Security Title Company placed all documents and monies
in court in an interpleader action, being under possible
suit from ,all defendants named in the interpleader action.
All defendants other than defendant, Eugenia R.
Hunt, answered and counter-claimed against the plaintiff.
Defendant, Eugenia H. Hunt, answered and cross-claimed
against all other defendants. ~\.ll other defendants an~wered the eross complaint and eounterelailned. Judge
Larsen, one of the judges in the lower court, felt that
affinnative relief for defendants to the cross-cmnplaint,
should be by affirmatiYe allegations for specific perfonnance and not by counter-elaim. The case went to pretrial before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson and to trial
before the Honorable l\Ierrill C. Faux, and specific performance was granted, and execution of the escrow ordered.
10
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1
THE
THE
FEE
ERR

PRE-TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN REMOVING
CASE FROM THE JURY CALANDER, THOUGH THE
HAD BEEN PAID, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
IN ITS DENIAL OF A JURY MADE AT THE TRIALPOINT 2

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 'THE ALTA
REALTY AND .CONSTRUCTION COMPANY COULD RECOVER IN THIS ACTION ON A NOTE REPRESENTING A
PART OF THE REALTY COMMISSION.
POINT 3
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT OWED $100.00 PER MONTH RENTAL TO THE
AOKI'S FOR THE USE OF 'THE APARTMENT OCCUPIED
BY HER, IN ADDITION TO THE RENTALS OF THE OTHER
APARTMENTS.
POINT 4
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN rTS F AlLURE TO FIND
THAT RAY HEMMINGWAY AND FLORENCE 0. YOUNG,
AGENTS OF ALL THE PARTIES HERE CONCERNED,
COMMITTED AND PRA·CTICED A CONTINUING FRAUD
UPON 'THE APPELLAN'l'.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN REMOVING
THE CASE FROM THE JURY CALANDER, THOUGH THE

11
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FEE HAD BEEN PAID, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN ITS DENIAL OF A JURY MADE AT THE TRIAL.

Refer to the pre-trial order (Record file P. 50).
The Co-urt: "Since the above entitled pretrial order was dictated, the court had a discussion
with counsel and discovered that the case had
been set for trial and discovered that a demand
for a jury has been filed and paid for by the defendant, Eugenia R IIunt, and in further discussion with counsel, discovered that counsel was
willing, for said defendant Hunt, to waive the
jury, and have the case tried before a judge with
out jury. Is that correct ~Ir. Huntsman 1"
Jfr. Hunstrnan: "Yes, that is correct."

The Court: "It is ordered by the Court that
the case be set on the 30th day of April at 10:00
o'clock A.M. for trial, without a jury, and that
the county clerk refund to Mr. Huntsman the jury
fee paid."
The pre-trial was heard and dictated on the 11th
day of April, 1958. The trial was heard April 30, 1958,
nineteen days later. Appellant willingly waived a jury
at said pre-trial, then nineteen days later at the trial,
requested one. The trial Court properly followed the pretrial order, which stated the trial would be without a jury.
The request for a jury at the trial was not timely
made, and the refusal of the trial court to entertain a
demand for a jury at the trial was entirely proper.
Refer to Utah State Buildh1g and Loan Association
v. Perkins, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950, which held, a demand
12
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for a jury at the time the case was called for trial came
too late.
POINT 2
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE ALTA
REALTY AND ·CONSTRUCTION COMPANY COULD RECOVER IN THIS ACTION ON A NOTE REPRESENTING A
PART OF THE REALTY COMMISSION.

The Alta Realty Company was the real estate agent
in this transaction, and entitled to a 5% real estate commission, as provided under the rules and regulations of
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board and Multiple Listing
Bureau, and allowed herein by the listing agreement,
(Exhibit 13 D) and the exchange agreement, (Exhibit
1 P). The com1nission allowed in this transaction was
$1,975.00, being 5% of the sales price of $39,500.00. The
commission, as evidence in the escrow, was to be paid
$1,000.00 in cash upon distribution of the escrow, and
a note (Exhibit 3), for $975.00 also to be distributed
in the escrow. The note calls for payments of $50.00 per
month.
The note was placed in evidence both at the pre-trial
and the trial \vithout objection. Specific performance
of the contract and execution of the escrow would ·allow
delivery of the instrument to said Alta Realty and Construction ·Company.
The trial in this cause was heard April 30, 1958. At
its completion, the Honorable Merrill C. Faux took the
case under advisement. On the 21st day of M·ay, 1958,
13
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counsel for all parties to the action were notified that
the Trial Court was going to decree specific performance,
and were required to appear before said trial court at
9 :00 A.M. on the 23rd day of May, 1958, for the purpose
of suggesting to the Court how the documents and funds
in the Court should be distributed. The conference was
held, suggestions were made, and the Court determined
that since Security Title Company had used November
1, 1957, as its closing date, that all documents and funds
be returned to said Security Title Company with instruCtions that the escrow be adjusted to the date of July 1,
1958, but to still use November 1, 1957, as the closing
date, and the documents and funds distributed through
the escrow on that basis.
The commission note was adjusted accordingly, the
same as all other documents were adjusted. This required
that the $50.00 monthly payment on said note be adjusted
through the escrow for payments from the closing date
of November 1, 1957, to July 1st, 1958. This procedure
is not collecting payments on a note for the real estate
commission, as the note itself has never been delivered.
It is an adjustlnent to the instructions of the escrow by
the Court, prior to the execution of the escrow.
Appellant na1ned Alta R.ealty and Construction Company as a defendant in their cross-complaint, and now
allege said Cmnpany is not a party to the action. The
Honorable Martin M. Larsen felt affirmative relief for
the defendants in the cross complaint, by way of specific
perfonnance of the contract and execution of the escrow
was more proper than by wa.y of counterclaim. It follows
14
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ho\vever, that specific performance of the contract, and
execution of the escrow, would result in delivery of the
adjusted note, to them, whether they be a party to the
action or not, just the same as the abstractor, the County
Recorder and others will receive money by virtue of the
escrow being executed, and they are not parties to the
action.
POINT 3
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT OWED $100.00 PER MONTH RENTAL TO THE
AOKI'S FOR THE USE OF 'THE APARTMENT OCCUPIED
BY HER, IN ADDITION TO THE RENTALS OF THE OTHER
APARTMENTS.

The contract herein, (Exhibit 2), upon which specific performance has been granted is also a document in
the escrow. Like all other documents in the escrow, it too
was adjusted to the date of July 1, 1958. Respondents
herein were entitled to the rentals from the apartments,
less the cost of the utilities, and appellant was entitled
to the $300.00 per month payment towards principal and
interest during the same period.
The basis to be used in determining the rental values
of the apartments were discussed at the special meetin~
called by the Honorable :Merrill ·C. Faux on the 23rd day
of Jlay, 1958. It was agreed that the basis to be used
would be the listing agreement itself. (Exhibit 13 D)
Appellant under her own signature in said listing agreement placed the rnonthly rental value of her own apartment to be $100.00 per month, and that amount wa~ accepted.
15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT 4
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS F AlLURE TO FIND
THAT RAY HEMMINGWAY AND FLORENCE 0. YOUNG,
AGENTS OF ALL THE PARTIES HERE CONCERNED,
COMMITTED AND PRACTICED A CONTINUING FRAUD
UPON '~'HE APPELLANT.

Paragraph 4 of the lower Court's findings, states in
part, to-wit: "The claim of the Cross Complainant of
misrepresentations of the exchange agreement, by defendant Alta Realty and Construction Company, was
insufficient," and Paragraph 3 therein reads as follows,
to-wit: "That the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated
October 10, 1958 (Exhibit 2 P herein), is a good valid
and binding contract, and the said listing agreement of
J nne 1, 1957, and the said Exchange Agreement of August
18, 1957, are fully merged therein."
Mter judgment was entered, appellant made a motion to the lower Court to amend the findings. The motion was argued and denied.
See footnote 46 of Rule 72(a) rtah Code Annotated,
1954.
"Supreme Court has full power to review
·all questions of law and fact in equity eases and
to set aside trial courts judg1nent if, in opinion
of Supren1e Court, such judg1nent is not supported by evidence, but where case was regularly tried, and trial court found on all material
issues, its findings will not be disturbed by
Supreme Court, unless they are so manifestly
erroneous as to demonstrate oversight or mis16
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take which 1naterially affect substantial rights
of appellant."
McKay vs. Farr (15-U-261), Klopenstine vs. Hayes
(20-l'-45)J1)lliu/ vs. ~Vhitmore (23-l'-3-l-2.)

And further, "in equity cases, unless Supreme Court
1s convinced that trial Court was clearly wrong in its
findings, the judgnwnt n1ust stand." Omega Iuvestmcnt
Co. vs. Walley 72-r-4·~--t
As to a real estate broker being an agent to both
buyer and seller, it is not only custmnary, but almost e~
sential, and the law is well settled on the point. See Aln.
J ur., Vol. 8, pp. 1012, para. 52. A real estate broker becomes an agent of the seller when he t·akes a listing to sell
a home. When he finds a buyer, and signs him up on an
Earnest Money Agreement he then becomes the agent of
the buyer so he can present the buyer's offer back to his
first principle, the seller.
In this particular case, the Exchange Agreement,
(Exhibit P1), <"learly authorizes, in writing, bearing appellant's signature thereto, the right of Alta Realty to
act as agent for both appellant and the other respondents.
Appellant's argument in Point 4 of Appellant's brief
is typical throughout the case. The starting point is with
the assumption there was a fraud, which in fact was never
shown, never found, ·and never existed.
I refer to Page 12 of appellant's brief, commencing
with the last paragraph therein. It is true Alta Realty
would be entitled to a real estate commission. It is true
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the Aokis' would take possession of the four-plex. However, it is also true that appellant would receive $300.00
per month on her contract on the four-plex, and it is
also true that appellant would receive $1,000.00 ~as a down
payment, and it is also true that appellant would receive
a contract on the 2nd South property which sold for
$10,500.00, and has an unpaid balance of $9,500.00 with
payment of $80.00 per month thereon at 6% interest.
The $80.00 per month payment is due to appellant from
Wanda Nelson, and at the request of appellant's counsel,
the payment is personally guaranteed by Ray Hemmingway, owner of .Alta Realty and Construction Company.

SUMMARY
The following is respectfully submitted to aid this
Honorable Court in reaching its decision:

1. Appellant voluntarily waived a jury at the pretrial.
2. The trial judge tried the case upon a pre-trial
order which stated it would be tried ·without a jury.
3. The request of appellant for a jury, at the trial
was not timely made.
4. That the AJt.a Realty and Construction Company
was named as a defendant in the cross-claim of appellant.
That upon exeeution of the escrow. would be entitled to
delivery of the note whether a party to the action or not.
5. That the appellant set the value of her apartment
in the four-pl0x at $100.00 per 1nonth in the listing agreement, and signed her name thereto.
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.. --------------------------------------------6. That the Court did not find fraud, and upon a
motion and hearing to amend the findings, the court reiterated there was no finding of fraud.
7. That appellant was with competent counsel for
two months between the signing of the exchange agreement and the final contract.
8. That appellant was with competent counsel each
time she appeared at Security Title Company for the
purpose of exmnining and signing the final papers, and
was with competent counsel at the time she actually
signed her name to the docmnents and paid the necessary
money into the escrow.
9. That at no place in the pleadings, or the trial,
did appellant attempt to set out the elements of a fraud,
although given every opportunity to do so. The entire accusations are by words of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, etc., without £acts or evidence to substantiate the
claim.

10. That respondents named in the action were n'Ot
even requested to attend the trial or be examined. That
appellant's case rests solely upon her own testimony and
even that is backed only by accusations without supporting facts or evidence.
WILLIAM C. QUIGLEY
Attorney for Respondents
1045 East 21st South, Suite
No.2, Salt Lake City. Utah
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